Oscar Ariza / nRF51822

nordic

Fork of nRF51822 by Nordic Semiconductor

source/btle/btle_security.cpp@526:d76f1c3f4599, 2015-12-02 (annotated)

Committer:
rgrover1
Date:
Wed Dec 02 13:14:17 2015 +0000
Revision:
526:d76f1c3f4599
Parent:
525:502e53732c75
Child:
542:884f95bf5351
Synchronized with git rev a5a46f2f

Author: Rohit Grover

Release 2.0.7

=============



* Fix a bug in the assembly sequence that starts the Nordic bootloader. With

  GCC, a MOV instruction was getting converted into an ADDS, which came with

  an unwanted side-effect of updating the XPSR. We relocated the offending MOV

  instruction such that it would not affect a conditional branch statement.

  This would show only with GCC, and when jumping to the bootloader while in

  handler mode.



* Fix hardfaults generated from the handling of Radio Notification events.

  Radio notification events are interrupts generated at very high priority.

  They have the potential to pre-empt other interrupt handling, causing race

  conditions when interrupted handlers were involved in calling into BLE_API.

  Radio-notification events should defer their callback handling to low-

  priority handlers through the use of Tickers or Timeouts.



* Introduce watchdog header file from Nordic SDK 8.1.



* Update license headers to reflect the latest licenses from Nordic.

Who changed what in which revision?

UserRevisionLine numberNew contents of line
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 1 /* mbed Microcontroller Library
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 2 * Copyright (c) 2006-2013 ARM Limited
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 3 *
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 4 * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 5 * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 6 * You may obtain a copy of the License at
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 7 *
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 8 * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 9 *
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 10 * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 11 * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 12 * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 13 * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 14 * limitations under the License.
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 15 */
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 16
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 17 #include "btle.h"
rgrover1 372:8f7d2137727a 18
rgrover1 394:0f7c5048efb3 19 #include "nRF5xGap.h"
rgrover1 394:0f7c5048efb3 20 #include "nRF5xSecurityManager.h"
rgrover1 372:8f7d2137727a 21
rgrover1 526:d76f1c3f4599 22 extern "C" {
rgrover1 526:d76f1c3f4599 23 #include "pstorage.h"
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 24 #include "device_manager.h"
rgrover1 526:d76f1c3f4599 25 }
rgrover1 526:d76f1c3f4599 26
rgrover1 135:df7e7964a9c3 27 #include "btle_security.h"
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 28
rgrover1 148:457a129dfa5e 29 static dm_application_instance_t applicationInstance;
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 30 static ret_code_t dm_handler(dm_handle_t const *p_handle, dm_event_t const *p_event, ret_code_t event_result);
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 31
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 32 ble_error_t
rgrover1 372:8f7d2137727a 33 btle_initializeSecurity(bool enableBonding,
rgrover1 372:8f7d2137727a 34 bool requireMITM,
rgrover1 372:8f7d2137727a 35 SecurityManager::SecurityIOCapabilities_t iocaps,
rgrover1 372:8f7d2137727a 36 const SecurityManager::Passkey_t passkey)
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 37 {
rgrover1 145:9d8fce4b4d5a 38 /* guard against multiple initializations */
rgrover1 145:9d8fce4b4d5a 39 static bool initialized = false;
rgrover1 145:9d8fce4b4d5a 40 if (initialized) {
rgrover1 145:9d8fce4b4d5a 41 return BLE_ERROR_NONE;
rgrover1 145:9d8fce4b4d5a 42 }
rgrover1 145:9d8fce4b4d5a 43
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 44 if (pstorage_init() != NRF_SUCCESS) {
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 45 return BLE_ERROR_UNSPECIFIED;
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 46 }
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 47
rgrover1 151:44c40836c82f 48 ret_code_t rc;
rgrover1 151:44c40836c82f 49 if (passkey) {
rgrover1 151:44c40836c82f 50 ble_opt_t opts;
rgrover1 151:44c40836c82f 51 opts.gap_opt.passkey.p_passkey = const_cast<uint8_t *>(passkey);
rgrover1 151:44c40836c82f 52 if ((rc = sd_ble_opt_set(BLE_GAP_OPT_PASSKEY, &opts)) != NRF_SUCCESS) {
rgrover1 151:44c40836c82f 53 switch (rc) {
rgrover1 151:44c40836c82f 54 case BLE_ERROR_INVALID_CONN_HANDLE:
rgrover1 151:44c40836c82f 55 case NRF_ERROR_INVALID_ADDR:
rgrover1 151:44c40836c82f 56 case NRF_ERROR_INVALID_PARAM:
rgrover1 151:44c40836c82f 57 default:
rgrover1 151:44c40836c82f 58 return BLE_ERROR_INVALID_PARAM;
rgrover1 151:44c40836c82f 59 case NRF_ERROR_INVALID_STATE:
rgrover1 151:44c40836c82f 60 return BLE_ERROR_INVALID_STATE;
rgrover1 151:44c40836c82f 61 case NRF_ERROR_BUSY:
rgrover1 151:44c40836c82f 62 return BLE_STACK_BUSY;
rgrover1 151:44c40836c82f 63 }
rgrover1 151:44c40836c82f 64 }
rgrover1 151:44c40836c82f 65 }
rgrover1 151:44c40836c82f 66
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 67 dm_init_param_t dm_init_param = {
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 68 .clear_persistent_data = false /* Set to true in case the module should clear all persistent data. */
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 69 };
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 70 if (dm_init(&dm_init_param) != NRF_SUCCESS) {
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 71 return BLE_ERROR_UNSPECIFIED;
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 72 }
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 73
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 74 const dm_application_param_t dm_param = {
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 75 .evt_handler = dm_handler,
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 76 .service_type = DM_PROTOCOL_CNTXT_GATT_CLI_ID,
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 77 .sec_param = {
rgrover1 151:44c40836c82f 78 .bond = enableBonding,/**< Perform bonding. */
rgrover1 151:44c40836c82f 79 .mitm = requireMITM, /**< Man In The Middle protection required. */
rgrover1 151:44c40836c82f 80 .io_caps = iocaps, /**< IO capabilities, see @ref BLE_GAP_IO_CAPS. */
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 81 .oob = 0, /**< Out Of Band data available. */
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 82 .min_key_size = 16, /**< Minimum encryption key size in octets between 7 and 16. If 0 then not applicable in this instance. */
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 83 .max_key_size = 16, /**< Maximum encryption key size in octets between min_key_size and 16. */
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 84 .kdist_periph = {
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 85 .enc = 1, /**< Long Term Key and Master Identification. */
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 86 .id = 1, /**< Identity Resolving Key and Identity Address Information. */
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 87 .sign = 1, /**< Connection Signature Resolving Key. */
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 88 }, /**< Key distribution bitmap: keys that the peripheral device will distribute. */
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 89 }
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 90 };
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 91
rgrover1 144:9d73e7f9f2bf 92 if ((rc = dm_register(&applicationInstance, &dm_param)) != NRF_SUCCESS) {
rgrover1 144:9d73e7f9f2bf 93 switch (rc) {
rgrover1 144:9d73e7f9f2bf 94 case NRF_ERROR_INVALID_STATE:
rgrover1 144:9d73e7f9f2bf 95 return BLE_ERROR_INVALID_STATE;
rgrover1 144:9d73e7f9f2bf 96 case NRF_ERROR_NO_MEM:
rgrover1 144:9d73e7f9f2bf 97 return BLE_ERROR_NO_MEM;
rgrover1 144:9d73e7f9f2bf 98 default:
rgrover1 144:9d73e7f9f2bf 99 return BLE_ERROR_UNSPECIFIED;
rgrover1 144:9d73e7f9f2bf 100 }
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 101 }
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 102
rgrover1 145:9d8fce4b4d5a 103 initialized = true;
rgrover1 144:9d73e7f9f2bf 104 return BLE_ERROR_NONE;
rgrover1 137:9bb49953de6a 105 }
rgrover1 137:9bb49953de6a 106
rgrover1 137:9bb49953de6a 107 ble_error_t
rgrover1 141:3a5282e3f30c 108 btle_purgeAllBondingState(void)
rgrover1 137:9bb49953de6a 109 {
rgrover1 137:9bb49953de6a 110 ret_code_t rc;
rgrover1 138:aafab7b0a8bd 111 if ((rc = dm_device_delete_all(&applicationInstance)) == NRF_SUCCESS) {
rgrover1 138:aafab7b0a8bd 112 return BLE_ERROR_NONE;
rgrover1 138:aafab7b0a8bd 113 }
rgrover1 137:9bb49953de6a 114
rgrover1 138:aafab7b0a8bd 115 switch (rc) {
rgrover1 138:aafab7b0a8bd 116 case NRF_ERROR_INVALID_STATE:
rgrover1 138:aafab7b0a8bd 117 return BLE_ERROR_INVALID_STATE;
rgrover1 138:aafab7b0a8bd 118 case NRF_ERROR_NO_MEM:
rgrover1 138:aafab7b0a8bd 119 return BLE_ERROR_NO_MEM;
rgrover1 138:aafab7b0a8bd 120 default:
rgrover1 138:aafab7b0a8bd 121 return BLE_ERROR_UNSPECIFIED;
rgrover1 138:aafab7b0a8bd 122 }
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 123 }
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 124
rgrover1 139:750eca573e18 125 ble_error_t
rgrover1 372:8f7d2137727a 126 btle_getLinkSecurity(Gap::Handle_t connectionHandle, SecurityManager::LinkSecurityStatus_t *securityStatusP)
rgrover1 139:750eca573e18 127 {
rgrover1 142:586e146a3903 128 ret_code_t rc;
rgrover1 149:a67b1b776aab 129 dm_handle_t dmHandle = {
rgrover1 149:a67b1b776aab 130 .appl_id = applicationInstance,
rgrover1 149:a67b1b776aab 131 };
rgrover1 139:750eca573e18 132 if ((rc = dm_handle_get(connectionHandle, &dmHandle)) != NRF_SUCCESS) {
rgrover1 139:750eca573e18 133 if (rc == NRF_ERROR_NOT_FOUND) {
rgrover1 139:750eca573e18 134 return BLE_ERROR_INVALID_PARAM;
rgrover1 139:750eca573e18 135 } else {
rgrover1 139:750eca573e18 136 return BLE_ERROR_UNSPECIFIED;
rgrover1 139:750eca573e18 137 }
rgrover1 139:750eca573e18 138 }
rgrover1 139:750eca573e18 139
rgrover1 139:750eca573e18 140 if ((rc = dm_security_status_req(&dmHandle, reinterpret_cast<dm_security_status_t *>(securityStatusP))) != NRF_SUCCESS) {
rgrover1 139:750eca573e18 141 switch (rc) {
rgrover1 139:750eca573e18 142 case NRF_ERROR_INVALID_STATE:
rgrover1 139:750eca573e18 143 return BLE_ERROR_INVALID_STATE;
rgrover1 139:750eca573e18 144 case NRF_ERROR_NO_MEM:
rgrover1 139:750eca573e18 145 return BLE_ERROR_NO_MEM;
rgrover1 139:750eca573e18 146 default:
rgrover1 139:750eca573e18 147 return BLE_ERROR_UNSPECIFIED;
rgrover1 139:750eca573e18 148 }
rgrover1 139:750eca573e18 149 }
rgrover1 139:750eca573e18 150
rgrover1 139:750eca573e18 151 return BLE_ERROR_NONE;
rgrover1 139:750eca573e18 152 }
rgrover1 139:750eca573e18 153
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 154 ret_code_t
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 155 dm_handler(dm_handle_t const *p_handle, dm_event_t const *p_event, ret_code_t event_result)
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 156 {
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 157 switch (p_event->event_id) {
rgrover1 153:0e74b7590ab2 158 case DM_EVT_SECURITY_SETUP: /* started */ {
rgrover1 153:0e74b7590ab2 159 const ble_gap_sec_params_t *peerParams = &p_event->event_param.p_gap_param->params.sec_params_request.peer_params;
rgrover1 394:0f7c5048efb3 160 nRF5xSecurityManager::getInstance().processSecuritySetupInitiatedEvent(p_event->event_param.p_gap_param->conn_handle,
rgrover1 372:8f7d2137727a 161 peerParams->bond,
rgrover1 372:8f7d2137727a 162 peerParams->mitm,
rgrover1 372:8f7d2137727a 163 (SecurityManager::SecurityIOCapabilities_t)peerParams->io_caps);
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 164 break;
rgrover1 153:0e74b7590ab2 165 }
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 166 case DM_EVT_SECURITY_SETUP_COMPLETE:
rgrover1 394:0f7c5048efb3 167 nRF5xSecurityManager::getInstance().
rgrover1 372:8f7d2137727a 168 processSecuritySetupCompletedEvent(p_event->event_param.p_gap_param->conn_handle,
rgrover1 372:8f7d2137727a 169 (SecurityManager::SecurityCompletionStatus_t)(p_event->event_param.p_gap_param->params.auth_status.auth_status));
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 170 break;
rgrover1 159:ad708a3d7ad7 171 case DM_EVT_LINK_SECURED: {
rgrover1 159:ad708a3d7ad7 172 unsigned securityMode = p_event->event_param.p_gap_param->params.conn_sec_update.conn_sec.sec_mode.sm;
rgrover1 159:ad708a3d7ad7 173 unsigned level = p_event->event_param.p_gap_param->params.conn_sec_update.conn_sec.sec_mode.lv;
rgrover1 372:8f7d2137727a 174 SecurityManager::SecurityMode_t resolvedSecurityMode = SecurityManager::SECURITY_MODE_NO_ACCESS;
rgrover1 159:ad708a3d7ad7 175 switch (securityMode) {
rgrover1 159:ad708a3d7ad7 176 case 1:
rgrover1 159:ad708a3d7ad7 177 switch (level) {
rgrover1 159:ad708a3d7ad7 178 case 1:
rgrover1 372:8f7d2137727a 179 resolvedSecurityMode = SecurityManager::SECURITY_MODE_ENCRYPTION_OPEN_LINK;
rgrover1 159:ad708a3d7ad7 180 break;
rgrover1 159:ad708a3d7ad7 181 case 2:
rgrover1 372:8f7d2137727a 182 resolvedSecurityMode = SecurityManager::SECURITY_MODE_ENCRYPTION_NO_MITM;
rgrover1 159:ad708a3d7ad7 183 break;
rgrover1 159:ad708a3d7ad7 184 case 3:
rgrover1 372:8f7d2137727a 185 resolvedSecurityMode = SecurityManager::SECURITY_MODE_ENCRYPTION_WITH_MITM;
rgrover1 159:ad708a3d7ad7 186 break;
rgrover1 159:ad708a3d7ad7 187 }
rgrover1 159:ad708a3d7ad7 188 break;
rgrover1 159:ad708a3d7ad7 189 case 2:
rgrover1 159:ad708a3d7ad7 190 switch (level) {
rgrover1 159:ad708a3d7ad7 191 case 1:
rgrover1 372:8f7d2137727a 192 resolvedSecurityMode = SecurityManager::SECURITY_MODE_SIGNED_NO_MITM;
rgrover1 159:ad708a3d7ad7 193 break;
rgrover1 159:ad708a3d7ad7 194 case 2:
rgrover1 372:8f7d2137727a 195 resolvedSecurityMode = SecurityManager::SECURITY_MODE_SIGNED_WITH_MITM;
rgrover1 159:ad708a3d7ad7 196 break;
rgrover1 159:ad708a3d7ad7 197 }
rgrover1 159:ad708a3d7ad7 198 break;
rgrover1 159:ad708a3d7ad7 199 }
rgrover1 159:ad708a3d7ad7 200
rgrover1 394:0f7c5048efb3 201 nRF5xSecurityManager::getInstance().processLinkSecuredEvent(p_event->event_param.p_gap_param->conn_handle, resolvedSecurityMode);
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 202 break;
rgrover1 159:ad708a3d7ad7 203 }
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 204 case DM_EVT_DEVICE_CONTEXT_STORED:
rgrover1 394:0f7c5048efb3 205 nRF5xSecurityManager::getInstance().processSecurityContextStoredEvent(p_event->event_param.p_gap_param->conn_handle);
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 206 break;
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 207 default:
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 208 break;
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 209 }
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 210
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 211 return NRF_SUCCESS;
rgrover1 134:74079098b3c9 212 }