Gleb Klochkov
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Climatcontroll_Main
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rsa.c
00001 /* 00002 * The RSA public-key cryptosystem 00003 * 00004 * Copyright (C) 2006-2015, ARM Limited, All Rights Reserved 00005 * SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 00006 * 00007 * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may 00008 * not use this file except in compliance with the License. 00009 * You may obtain a copy of the License at 00010 * 00011 * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 00012 * 00013 * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software 00014 * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT 00015 * WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. 00016 * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and 00017 * limitations under the License. 00018 * 00019 * This file is part of mbed TLS (https://tls.mbed.org) 00020 */ 00021 00022 /* 00023 * The following sources were referenced in the design of this implementation 00024 * of the RSA algorithm: 00025 * 00026 * [1] A method for obtaining digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems 00027 * R Rivest, A Shamir, and L Adleman 00028 * http://people.csail.mit.edu/rivest/pubs.html#RSA78 00029 * 00030 * [2] Handbook of Applied Cryptography - 1997, Chapter 8 00031 * Menezes, van Oorschot and Vanstone 00032 * 00033 * [3] Malware Guard Extension: Using SGX to Conceal Cache Attacks 00034 * Michael Schwarz, Samuel Weiser, Daniel Gruss, Clémentine Maurice and 00035 * Stefan Mangard 00036 * https://arxiv.org/abs/1702.08719v2 00037 * 00038 */ 00039 00040 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE) 00041 #include "mbedtls/config.h" 00042 #else 00043 #include MBEDTLS_CONFIG_FILE 00044 #endif 00045 00046 #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_C) 00047 00048 #include "mbedtls/rsa.h" 00049 #include "mbedtls/rsa_internal.h" 00050 #include "mbedtls/oid.h" 00051 00052 #include <string.h> 00053 00054 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) 00055 #include "mbedtls/md.h" 00056 #endif 00057 00058 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) && !defined(__OpenBSD__) 00059 #include <stdlib.h> 00060 #endif 00061 00062 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PLATFORM_C) 00063 #include "mbedtls/platform.h" 00064 #else 00065 #include <stdio.h> 00066 #define mbedtls_printf printf 00067 #define mbedtls_calloc calloc 00068 #define mbedtls_free free 00069 #endif 00070 00071 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT) 00072 00073 /* Implementation that should never be optimized out by the compiler */ 00074 static void mbedtls_zeroize( void *v, size_t n ) { 00075 volatile unsigned char *p = (unsigned char*)v; while( n-- ) *p++ = 0; 00076 } 00077 00078 /* constant-time buffer comparison */ 00079 static inline int mbedtls_safer_memcmp( const void *a, const void *b, size_t n ) 00080 { 00081 size_t i; 00082 const unsigned char *A = (const unsigned char *) a; 00083 const unsigned char *B = (const unsigned char *) b; 00084 unsigned char diff = 0; 00085 00086 for( i = 0; i < n; i++ ) 00087 diff |= A[i] ^ B[i]; 00088 00089 return( diff ); 00090 } 00091 00092 int mbedtls_rsa_import( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, 00093 const mbedtls_mpi *N, 00094 const mbedtls_mpi *P, const mbedtls_mpi *Q, 00095 const mbedtls_mpi *D, const mbedtls_mpi *E ) 00096 { 00097 int ret; 00098 00099 if( ( N != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->N , N ) ) != 0 ) || 00100 ( P != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->P , P ) ) != 0 ) || 00101 ( Q != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->Q , Q ) ) != 0 ) || 00102 ( D != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->D , D ) ) != 0 ) || 00103 ( E != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( &ctx->E , E ) ) != 0 ) ) 00104 { 00105 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + ret ); 00106 } 00107 00108 if( N != NULL ) 00109 ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->N ); 00110 00111 return( 0 ); 00112 } 00113 00114 int mbedtls_rsa_import_raw( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, 00115 unsigned char const *N, size_t N_len, 00116 unsigned char const *P, size_t P_len, 00117 unsigned char const *Q, size_t Q_len, 00118 unsigned char const *D, size_t D_len, 00119 unsigned char const *E, size_t E_len ) 00120 { 00121 int ret = 0; 00122 00123 if( N != NULL ) 00124 { 00125 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->N , N, N_len ) ); 00126 ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->N ); 00127 } 00128 00129 if( P != NULL ) 00130 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->P , P, P_len ) ); 00131 00132 if( Q != NULL ) 00133 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->Q , Q, Q_len ) ); 00134 00135 if( D != NULL ) 00136 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->D , D, D_len ) ); 00137 00138 if( E != NULL ) 00139 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &ctx->E , E, E_len ) ); 00140 00141 cleanup: 00142 00143 if( ret != 0 ) 00144 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + ret ); 00145 00146 return( 0 ); 00147 } 00148 00149 /* 00150 * Checks whether the context fields are set in such a way 00151 * that the RSA primitives will be able to execute without error. 00152 * It does *not* make guarantees for consistency of the parameters. 00153 */ 00154 static int rsa_check_context( mbedtls_rsa_context const *ctx, int is_priv, 00155 int blinding_needed ) 00156 { 00157 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) 00158 /* blinding_needed is only used for NO_CRT to decide whether 00159 * P,Q need to be present or not. */ 00160 ((void) blinding_needed); 00161 #endif 00162 00163 if( ctx->len != mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->N ) || 00164 ctx->len > MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE ) 00165 { 00166 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 00167 } 00168 00169 /* 00170 * 1. Modular exponentiation needs positive, odd moduli. 00171 */ 00172 00173 /* Modular exponentiation wrt. N is always used for 00174 * RSA public key operations. */ 00175 if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->N , 0 ) <= 0 || 00176 mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &ctx->N , 0 ) == 0 ) 00177 { 00178 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 00179 } 00180 00181 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) 00182 /* Modular exponentiation for P and Q is only 00183 * used for private key operations and if CRT 00184 * is used. */ 00185 if( is_priv && 00186 ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P , 0 ) <= 0 || 00187 mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &ctx->P , 0 ) == 0 || 00188 mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q , 0 ) <= 0 || 00189 mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &ctx->Q , 0 ) == 0 ) ) 00190 { 00191 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 00192 } 00193 #endif /* !MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ 00194 00195 /* 00196 * 2. Exponents must be positive 00197 */ 00198 00199 /* Always need E for public key operations */ 00200 if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->E , 0 ) <= 0 ) 00201 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 00202 00203 #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) 00204 /* For private key operations, use D or DP & DQ 00205 * as (unblinded) exponents. */ 00206 if( is_priv && mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->D , 0 ) <= 0 ) 00207 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 00208 #else 00209 if( is_priv && 00210 ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->DP , 0 ) <= 0 || 00211 mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->DQ , 0 ) <= 0 ) ) 00212 { 00213 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 00214 } 00215 #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ 00216 00217 /* Blinding shouldn't make exponents negative either, 00218 * so check that P, Q >= 1 if that hasn't yet been 00219 * done as part of 1. */ 00220 #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) 00221 if( is_priv && blinding_needed && 00222 ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P , 0 ) <= 0 || 00223 mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q , 0 ) <= 0 ) ) 00224 { 00225 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 00226 } 00227 #endif 00228 00229 /* It wouldn't lead to an error if it wasn't satisfied, 00230 * but check for QP >= 1 nonetheless. */ 00231 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) 00232 if( is_priv && 00233 mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->QP , 0 ) <= 0 ) 00234 { 00235 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 00236 } 00237 #endif 00238 00239 return( 0 ); 00240 } 00241 00242 int mbedtls_rsa_complete( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ) 00243 { 00244 int ret = 0; 00245 00246 const int have_N = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->N , 0 ) != 0 ); 00247 const int have_P = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P , 0 ) != 0 ); 00248 const int have_Q = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q , 0 ) != 0 ); 00249 const int have_D = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->D , 0 ) != 0 ); 00250 const int have_E = ( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->E , 0 ) != 0 ); 00251 00252 /* 00253 * Check whether provided parameters are enough 00254 * to deduce all others. The following incomplete 00255 * parameter sets for private keys are supported: 00256 * 00257 * (1) P, Q missing. 00258 * (2) D and potentially N missing. 00259 * 00260 */ 00261 00262 const int n_missing = have_P && have_Q && have_D && have_E; 00263 const int pq_missing = have_N && !have_P && !have_Q && have_D && have_E; 00264 const int d_missing = have_P && have_Q && !have_D && have_E; 00265 const int is_pub = have_N && !have_P && !have_Q && !have_D && have_E; 00266 00267 /* These three alternatives are mutually exclusive */ 00268 const int is_priv = n_missing || pq_missing || d_missing; 00269 00270 if( !is_priv && !is_pub ) 00271 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 00272 00273 /* 00274 * Step 1: Deduce N if P, Q are provided. 00275 */ 00276 00277 if( !have_N && have_P && have_Q ) 00278 { 00279 if( ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->N , &ctx->P , 00280 &ctx->Q ) ) != 0 ) 00281 { 00282 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + ret ); 00283 } 00284 00285 ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->N ); 00286 } 00287 00288 /* 00289 * Step 2: Deduce and verify all remaining core parameters. 00290 */ 00291 00292 if( pq_missing ) 00293 { 00294 ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_primes( &ctx->N , &ctx->E , &ctx->D , 00295 &ctx->P , &ctx->Q ); 00296 if( ret != 0 ) 00297 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + ret ); 00298 00299 } 00300 else if( d_missing ) 00301 { 00302 if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_private_exponent( &ctx->P , 00303 &ctx->Q , 00304 &ctx->E , 00305 &ctx->D ) ) != 0 ) 00306 { 00307 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + ret ); 00308 } 00309 } 00310 00311 /* 00312 * Step 3: Deduce all additional parameters specific 00313 * to our current RSA implementation. 00314 */ 00315 00316 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) 00317 if( is_priv ) 00318 { 00319 ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt( &ctx->P , &ctx->Q , &ctx->D , 00320 &ctx->DP , &ctx->DQ , &ctx->QP ); 00321 if( ret != 0 ) 00322 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + ret ); 00323 } 00324 #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ 00325 00326 /* 00327 * Step 3: Basic sanity checks 00328 */ 00329 00330 return( rsa_check_context( ctx, is_priv, 1 ) ); 00331 } 00332 00333 int mbedtls_rsa_export_raw( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, 00334 unsigned char *N, size_t N_len, 00335 unsigned char *P, size_t P_len, 00336 unsigned char *Q, size_t Q_len, 00337 unsigned char *D, size_t D_len, 00338 unsigned char *E, size_t E_len ) 00339 { 00340 int ret = 0; 00341 00342 /* Check if key is private or public */ 00343 const int is_priv = 00344 mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->N , 0 ) != 0 && 00345 mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P , 0 ) != 0 && 00346 mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q , 0 ) != 0 && 00347 mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->D , 0 ) != 0 && 00348 mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->E , 0 ) != 0; 00349 00350 if( !is_priv ) 00351 { 00352 /* If we're trying to export private parameters for a public key, 00353 * something must be wrong. */ 00354 if( P != NULL || Q != NULL || D != NULL ) 00355 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 00356 00357 } 00358 00359 if( N != NULL ) 00360 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->N , N, N_len ) ); 00361 00362 if( P != NULL ) 00363 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->P , P, P_len ) ); 00364 00365 if( Q != NULL ) 00366 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->Q , Q, Q_len ) ); 00367 00368 if( D != NULL ) 00369 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->D , D, D_len ) ); 00370 00371 if( E != NULL ) 00372 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &ctx->E , E, E_len ) ); 00373 00374 cleanup: 00375 00376 return( ret ); 00377 } 00378 00379 int mbedtls_rsa_export( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, 00380 mbedtls_mpi *N, mbedtls_mpi *P, mbedtls_mpi *Q, 00381 mbedtls_mpi *D, mbedtls_mpi *E ) 00382 { 00383 int ret; 00384 00385 /* Check if key is private or public */ 00386 int is_priv = 00387 mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->N , 0 ) != 0 && 00388 mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P , 0 ) != 0 && 00389 mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q , 0 ) != 0 && 00390 mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->D , 0 ) != 0 && 00391 mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->E , 0 ) != 0; 00392 00393 if( !is_priv ) 00394 { 00395 /* If we're trying to export private parameters for a public key, 00396 * something must be wrong. */ 00397 if( P != NULL || Q != NULL || D != NULL ) 00398 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 00399 00400 } 00401 00402 /* Export all requested core parameters. */ 00403 00404 if( ( N != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( N, &ctx->N ) ) != 0 ) || 00405 ( P != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( P, &ctx->P ) ) != 0 ) || 00406 ( Q != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( Q, &ctx->Q ) ) != 0 ) || 00407 ( D != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( D, &ctx->D ) ) != 0 ) || 00408 ( E != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( E, &ctx->E ) ) != 0 ) ) 00409 { 00410 return( ret ); 00411 } 00412 00413 return( 0 ); 00414 } 00415 00416 /* 00417 * Export CRT parameters 00418 * This must also be implemented if CRT is not used, for being able to 00419 * write DER encoded RSA keys. The helper function mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt 00420 * can be used in this case. 00421 */ 00422 int mbedtls_rsa_export_crt( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, 00423 mbedtls_mpi *DP, mbedtls_mpi *DQ, mbedtls_mpi *QP ) 00424 { 00425 int ret; 00426 00427 /* Check if key is private or public */ 00428 int is_priv = 00429 mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->N , 0 ) != 0 && 00430 mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->P , 0 ) != 0 && 00431 mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Q , 0 ) != 0 && 00432 mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->D , 0 ) != 0 && 00433 mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->E , 0 ) != 0; 00434 00435 if( !is_priv ) 00436 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 00437 00438 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) 00439 /* Export all requested blinding parameters. */ 00440 if( ( DP != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( DP, &ctx->DP ) ) != 0 ) || 00441 ( DQ != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( DQ, &ctx->DQ ) ) != 0 ) || 00442 ( QP != NULL && ( ret = mbedtls_mpi_copy( QP, &ctx->QP ) ) != 0 ) ) 00443 { 00444 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + ret ); 00445 } 00446 #else 00447 if( ( ret = mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt( &ctx->P , &ctx->Q , &ctx->D , 00448 DP, DQ, QP ) ) != 0 ) 00449 { 00450 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA + ret ); 00451 } 00452 #endif 00453 00454 return( 0 ); 00455 } 00456 00457 /* 00458 * Initialize an RSA context 00459 */ 00460 void mbedtls_rsa_init( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, 00461 int padding, 00462 int hash_id ) 00463 { 00464 memset( ctx, 0, sizeof( mbedtls_rsa_context ) ); 00465 00466 mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( ctx, padding, hash_id ); 00467 00468 #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) 00469 mbedtls_mutex_init( &ctx->mutex ); 00470 #endif 00471 } 00472 00473 /* 00474 * Set padding for an existing RSA context 00475 */ 00476 void mbedtls_rsa_set_padding( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, int padding, int hash_id ) 00477 { 00478 ctx->padding = padding; 00479 ctx->hash_id = hash_id; 00480 } 00481 00482 /* 00483 * Get length in bytes of RSA modulus 00484 */ 00485 00486 size_t mbedtls_rsa_get_len( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ) 00487 { 00488 return( ctx->len ); 00489 } 00490 00491 00492 #if defined(MBEDTLS_GENPRIME) 00493 00494 /* 00495 * Generate an RSA keypair 00496 */ 00497 int mbedtls_rsa_gen_key( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, 00498 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), 00499 void *p_rng, 00500 unsigned int nbits, int exponent ) 00501 { 00502 int ret; 00503 mbedtls_mpi H, G; 00504 00505 if( f_rng == NULL || nbits < 128 || exponent < 3 ) 00506 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 00507 00508 if( nbits % 2 ) 00509 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 00510 00511 mbedtls_mpi_init( &H ); 00512 mbedtls_mpi_init( &G ); 00513 00514 /* 00515 * find primes P and Q with Q < P so that: 00516 * GCD( E, (P-1)*(Q-1) ) == 1 00517 */ 00518 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_lset( &ctx->E , exponent ) ); 00519 00520 do 00521 { 00522 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( &ctx->P , nbits >> 1, 0, 00523 f_rng, p_rng ) ); 00524 00525 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gen_prime( &ctx->Q , nbits >> 1, 0, 00526 f_rng, p_rng ) ); 00527 00528 if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &ctx->P , &ctx->Q ) == 0 ) 00529 continue; 00530 00531 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->N , &ctx->P , &ctx->Q ) ); 00532 if( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->N ) != nbits ) 00533 continue; 00534 00535 if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &ctx->P , &ctx->Q ) < 0 ) 00536 mbedtls_mpi_swap( &ctx->P , &ctx->Q ); 00537 00538 /* Temporarily replace P,Q by P-1, Q-1 */ 00539 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &ctx->P , &ctx->P , 1 ) ); 00540 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &ctx->Q , &ctx->Q , 1 ) ); 00541 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &H, &ctx->P , &ctx->Q ) ); 00542 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gcd( &G, &ctx->E , &H ) ); 00543 } 00544 while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &G, 1 ) != 0 ); 00545 00546 /* Restore P,Q */ 00547 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( &ctx->P , &ctx->P , 1 ) ); 00548 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_int( &ctx->Q , &ctx->Q , 1 ) ); 00549 00550 ctx->len = mbedtls_mpi_size( &ctx->N ); 00551 00552 /* 00553 * D = E^-1 mod ((P-1)*(Q-1)) 00554 * DP = D mod (P - 1) 00555 * DQ = D mod (Q - 1) 00556 * QP = Q^-1 mod P 00557 */ 00558 00559 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &ctx->D , &ctx->E , &H ) ); 00560 00561 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) 00562 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_deduce_crt( &ctx->P , &ctx->Q , &ctx->D , 00563 &ctx->DP , &ctx->DQ , &ctx->QP ) ); 00564 #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ 00565 00566 /* Double-check */ 00567 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( ctx ) ); 00568 00569 cleanup: 00570 00571 mbedtls_mpi_free( &H ); 00572 mbedtls_mpi_free( &G ); 00573 00574 if( ret != 0 ) 00575 { 00576 mbedtls_rsa_free( ctx ); 00577 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_GEN_FAILED + ret ); 00578 } 00579 00580 return( 0 ); 00581 } 00582 00583 #endif /* MBEDTLS_GENPRIME */ 00584 00585 /* 00586 * Check a public RSA key 00587 */ 00588 int mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ) 00589 { 00590 if( rsa_check_context( ctx, 0 /* public */, 0 /* no blinding */ ) != 0 ) 00591 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); 00592 00593 if( mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->N ) < 128 ) 00594 { 00595 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); 00596 } 00597 00598 if( mbedtls_mpi_get_bit( &ctx->E , 0 ) == 0 || 00599 mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->E ) < 2 || 00600 mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &ctx->E , &ctx->N ) >= 0 ) 00601 { 00602 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); 00603 } 00604 00605 return( 0 ); 00606 } 00607 00608 /* 00609 * Check for the consistency of all fields in an RSA private key context 00610 */ 00611 int mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( const mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ) 00612 { 00613 if( mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( ctx ) != 0 || 00614 rsa_check_context( ctx, 1 /* private */, 1 /* blinding */ ) != 0 ) 00615 { 00616 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); 00617 } 00618 00619 if( mbedtls_rsa_validate_params( &ctx->N , &ctx->P , &ctx->Q , 00620 &ctx->D , &ctx->E , NULL, NULL ) != 0 ) 00621 { 00622 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); 00623 } 00624 00625 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) 00626 else if( mbedtls_rsa_validate_crt( &ctx->P , &ctx->Q , &ctx->D , 00627 &ctx->DP , &ctx->DQ , &ctx->QP ) != 0 ) 00628 { 00629 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); 00630 } 00631 #endif 00632 00633 return( 0 ); 00634 } 00635 00636 /* 00637 * Check if contexts holding a public and private key match 00638 */ 00639 int mbedtls_rsa_check_pub_priv( const mbedtls_rsa_context *pub, 00640 const mbedtls_rsa_context *prv ) 00641 { 00642 if( mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( pub ) != 0 || 00643 mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( prv ) != 0 ) 00644 { 00645 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); 00646 } 00647 00648 if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pub->N , &prv->N ) != 0 || 00649 mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &pub->E , &prv->E ) != 0 ) 00650 { 00651 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_KEY_CHECK_FAILED ); 00652 } 00653 00654 return( 0 ); 00655 } 00656 00657 /* 00658 * Do an RSA public key operation 00659 */ 00660 int mbedtls_rsa_public( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, 00661 const unsigned char *input, 00662 unsigned char *output ) 00663 { 00664 int ret; 00665 size_t olen; 00666 mbedtls_mpi T; 00667 00668 if( rsa_check_context( ctx, 0 /* public */, 0 /* no blinding */ ) ) 00669 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 00670 00671 mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); 00672 00673 #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) 00674 if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) 00675 return( ret ); 00676 #endif 00677 00678 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &T, input, ctx->len ) ); 00679 00680 if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &T, &ctx->N ) >= 0 ) 00681 { 00682 ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; 00683 goto cleanup; 00684 } 00685 00686 olen = ctx->len ; 00687 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &T, &T, &ctx->E , &ctx->N , &ctx->RN ) ); 00688 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &T, output, olen ) ); 00689 00690 cleanup: 00691 #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) 00692 if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 ) 00693 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ); 00694 #endif 00695 00696 mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); 00697 00698 if( ret != 0 ) 00699 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PUBLIC_FAILED + ret ); 00700 00701 return( 0 ); 00702 } 00703 00704 /* 00705 * Generate or update blinding values, see section 10 of: 00706 * KOCHER, Paul C. Timing attacks on implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, 00707 * DSS, and other systems. In : Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO'96. Springer 00708 * Berlin Heidelberg, 1996. p. 104-113. 00709 */ 00710 static int rsa_prepare_blinding( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, 00711 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), void *p_rng ) 00712 { 00713 int ret, count = 0; 00714 00715 if( ctx->Vf .p != NULL ) 00716 { 00717 /* We already have blinding values, just update them by squaring */ 00718 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vi , &ctx->Vi , &ctx->Vi ) ); 00719 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vi , &ctx->Vi , &ctx->N ) ); 00720 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &ctx->Vf , &ctx->Vf , &ctx->Vf ) ); 00721 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &ctx->Vf , &ctx->Vf , &ctx->N ) ); 00722 00723 goto cleanup; 00724 } 00725 00726 /* Unblinding value: Vf = random number, invertible mod N */ 00727 do { 00728 if( count++ > 10 ) 00729 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED ); 00730 00731 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &ctx->Vf , ctx->len - 1, f_rng, p_rng ) ); 00732 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_gcd( &ctx->Vi , &ctx->Vf , &ctx->N ) ); 00733 } while( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_int( &ctx->Vi , 1 ) != 0 ); 00734 00735 /* Blinding value: Vi = Vf^(-e) mod N */ 00736 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_inv_mod( &ctx->Vi , &ctx->Vf , &ctx->N ) ); 00737 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &ctx->Vi , &ctx->Vi , &ctx->E , &ctx->N , &ctx->RN ) ); 00738 00739 00740 cleanup: 00741 return( ret ); 00742 } 00743 00744 /* 00745 * Exponent blinding supposed to prevent side-channel attacks using multiple 00746 * traces of measurements to recover the RSA key. The more collisions are there, 00747 * the more bits of the key can be recovered. See [3]. 00748 * 00749 * Collecting n collisions with m bit long blinding value requires 2^(m-m/n) 00750 * observations on avarage. 00751 * 00752 * For example with 28 byte blinding to achieve 2 collisions the adversary has 00753 * to make 2^112 observations on avarage. 00754 * 00755 * (With the currently (as of 2017 April) known best algorithms breaking 2048 00756 * bit RSA requires approximately as much time as trying out 2^112 random keys. 00757 * Thus in this sense with 28 byte blinding the security is not reduced by 00758 * side-channel attacks like the one in [3]) 00759 * 00760 * This countermeasure does not help if the key recovery is possible with a 00761 * single trace. 00762 */ 00763 #define RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING 28 00764 00765 /* 00766 * Do an RSA private key operation 00767 */ 00768 int mbedtls_rsa_private( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, 00769 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), 00770 void *p_rng, 00771 const unsigned char *input, 00772 unsigned char *output ) 00773 { 00774 int ret; 00775 size_t olen; 00776 mbedtls_mpi T, T1, T2; 00777 mbedtls_mpi P1, Q1, R; 00778 #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) 00779 mbedtls_mpi D_blind; 00780 mbedtls_mpi *D = &ctx->D ; 00781 #else 00782 mbedtls_mpi DP_blind, DQ_blind; 00783 mbedtls_mpi *DP = &ctx->DP ; 00784 mbedtls_mpi *DQ = &ctx->DQ ; 00785 #endif 00786 00787 if( rsa_check_context( ctx, 1 /* private key checks */, 00788 f_rng != NULL /* blinding y/n */ ) != 0 ) 00789 { 00790 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 00791 } 00792 00793 mbedtls_mpi_init( &T ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &T2 ); 00794 mbedtls_mpi_init( &P1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &Q1 ); mbedtls_mpi_init( &R ); 00795 00796 if( f_rng != NULL ) 00797 { 00798 #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) 00799 mbedtls_mpi_init( &D_blind ); 00800 #else 00801 mbedtls_mpi_init( &DP_blind ); 00802 mbedtls_mpi_init( &DQ_blind ); 00803 #endif 00804 } 00805 00806 00807 #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) 00808 if( ( ret = mbedtls_mutex_lock( &ctx->mutex ) ) != 0 ) 00809 return( ret ); 00810 #endif 00811 00812 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_binary( &T, input, ctx->len ) ); 00813 if( mbedtls_mpi_cmp_mpi( &T, &ctx->N ) >= 0 ) 00814 { 00815 ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_BAD_INPUT_DATA; 00816 goto cleanup; 00817 } 00818 00819 if( f_rng != NULL ) 00820 { 00821 /* 00822 * Blinding 00823 * T = T * Vi mod N 00824 */ 00825 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( rsa_prepare_blinding( ctx, f_rng, p_rng ) ); 00826 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->Vi ) ); 00827 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->N ) ); 00828 00829 /* 00830 * Exponent blinding 00831 */ 00832 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &P1, &ctx->P , 1 ) ); 00833 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_int( &Q1, &ctx->Q , 1 ) ); 00834 00835 #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) 00836 /* 00837 * D_blind = ( P - 1 ) * ( Q - 1 ) * R + D 00838 */ 00839 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, 00840 f_rng, p_rng ) ); 00841 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &D_blind, &P1, &Q1 ) ); 00842 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &D_blind, &D_blind, &R ) ); 00843 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &D_blind, &D_blind, &ctx->D ) ); 00844 00845 D = &D_blind; 00846 #else 00847 /* 00848 * DP_blind = ( P - 1 ) * R + DP 00849 */ 00850 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, 00851 f_rng, p_rng ) ); 00852 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &DP_blind, &P1, &R ) ); 00853 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &DP_blind, &DP_blind, 00854 &ctx->DP ) ); 00855 00856 DP = &DP_blind; 00857 00858 /* 00859 * DQ_blind = ( Q - 1 ) * R + DQ 00860 */ 00861 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_fill_random( &R, RSA_EXPONENT_BLINDING, 00862 f_rng, p_rng ) ); 00863 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &DQ_blind, &Q1, &R ) ); 00864 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &DQ_blind, &DQ_blind, 00865 &ctx->DQ ) ); 00866 00867 DQ = &DQ_blind; 00868 #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ 00869 } 00870 00871 #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) 00872 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &T, &T, D, &ctx->N , &ctx->RN ) ); 00873 #else 00874 /* 00875 * Faster decryption using the CRT 00876 * 00877 * T1 = input ^ dP mod P 00878 * T2 = input ^ dQ mod Q 00879 */ 00880 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &T1, &T, DP, &ctx->P , &ctx->RP ) ); 00881 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_exp_mod( &T2, &T, DQ, &ctx->Q , &ctx->RQ ) ); 00882 00883 /* 00884 * T = (T1 - T2) * (Q^-1 mod P) mod P 00885 */ 00886 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_sub_mpi( &T, &T1, &T2 ) ); 00887 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T1, &T, &ctx->QP ) ); 00888 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &T, &T1, &ctx->P ) ); 00889 00890 /* 00891 * T = T2 + T * Q 00892 */ 00893 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T1, &T, &ctx->Q ) ); 00894 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_add_mpi( &T, &T2, &T1 ) ); 00895 #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ 00896 00897 if( f_rng != NULL ) 00898 { 00899 /* 00900 * Unblind 00901 * T = T * Vf mod N 00902 */ 00903 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mul_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->Vf ) ); 00904 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_mod_mpi( &T, &T, &ctx->N ) ); 00905 } 00906 00907 olen = ctx->len ; 00908 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_write_binary( &T, output, olen ) ); 00909 00910 cleanup: 00911 #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) 00912 if( mbedtls_mutex_unlock( &ctx->mutex ) != 0 ) 00913 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_THREADING_MUTEX_ERROR ); 00914 #endif 00915 00916 mbedtls_mpi_free( &T ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &T1 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &T2 ); 00917 mbedtls_mpi_free( &P1 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &Q1 ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &R ); 00918 00919 if( f_rng != NULL ) 00920 { 00921 #if defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) 00922 mbedtls_mpi_free( &D_blind ); 00923 #else 00924 mbedtls_mpi_free( &DP_blind ); 00925 mbedtls_mpi_free( &DQ_blind ); 00926 #endif 00927 } 00928 00929 if( ret != 0 ) 00930 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED + ret ); 00931 00932 return( 0 ); 00933 } 00934 00935 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) 00936 /** 00937 * Generate and apply the MGF1 operation (from PKCS#1 v2.1) to a buffer. 00938 * 00939 * \param dst buffer to mask 00940 * \param dlen length of destination buffer 00941 * \param src source of the mask generation 00942 * \param slen length of the source buffer 00943 * \param md_ctx message digest context to use 00944 */ 00945 static int mgf_mask( unsigned char *dst, size_t dlen, unsigned char *src, 00946 size_t slen, mbedtls_md_context_t *md_ctx ) 00947 { 00948 unsigned char mask[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; 00949 unsigned char counter[4]; 00950 unsigned char *p; 00951 unsigned int hlen; 00952 size_t i, use_len; 00953 int ret = 0; 00954 00955 memset( mask, 0, MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE ); 00956 memset( counter, 0, 4 ); 00957 00958 hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_ctx->md_info ); 00959 00960 /* Generate and apply dbMask */ 00961 p = dst; 00962 00963 while( dlen > 0 ) 00964 { 00965 use_len = hlen; 00966 if( dlen < hlen ) 00967 use_len = dlen; 00968 00969 if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) 00970 goto exit; 00971 if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, src, slen ) ) != 0 ) 00972 goto exit; 00973 if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( md_ctx, counter, 4 ) ) != 0 ) 00974 goto exit; 00975 if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_finish( md_ctx, mask ) ) != 0 ) 00976 goto exit; 00977 00978 for( i = 0; i < use_len; ++i ) 00979 *p++ ^= mask[i]; 00980 00981 counter[3]++; 00982 00983 dlen -= use_len; 00984 } 00985 00986 exit: 00987 mbedtls_zeroize( mask, sizeof( mask ) ); 00988 00989 return( ret ); 00990 } 00991 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ 00992 00993 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) 00994 /* 00995 * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-OAEP-ENCRYPT function 00996 */ 00997 int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, 00998 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), 00999 void *p_rng, 01000 int mode, 01001 const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, 01002 size_t ilen, 01003 const unsigned char *input, 01004 unsigned char *output ) 01005 { 01006 size_t olen; 01007 int ret; 01008 unsigned char *p = output; 01009 unsigned int hlen; 01010 const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; 01011 mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; 01012 01013 if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 ) 01014 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 01015 01016 if( f_rng == NULL ) 01017 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 01018 01019 md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id ); 01020 if( md_info == NULL ) 01021 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 01022 01023 olen = ctx->len ; 01024 hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); 01025 01026 /* first comparison checks for overflow */ 01027 if( ilen + 2 * hlen + 2 < ilen || olen < ilen + 2 * hlen + 2 ) 01028 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 01029 01030 memset( output, 0, olen ); 01031 01032 *p++ = 0; 01033 01034 /* Generate a random octet string seed */ 01035 if( ( ret = f_rng( p_rng, p, hlen ) ) != 0 ) 01036 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED + ret ); 01037 01038 p += hlen; 01039 01040 /* Construct DB */ 01041 if( ( ret = mbedtls_md( md_info, label, label_len, p ) ) != 0 ) 01042 return( ret ); 01043 p += hlen; 01044 p += olen - 2 * hlen - 2 - ilen; 01045 *p++ = 1; 01046 memcpy( p, input, ilen ); 01047 01048 mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx ); 01049 if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 ) 01050 goto exit; 01051 01052 /* maskedDB: Apply dbMask to DB */ 01053 if( ( ret = mgf_mask( output + hlen + 1, olen - hlen - 1, output + 1, hlen, 01054 &md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) 01055 goto exit; 01056 01057 /* maskedSeed: Apply seedMask to seed */ 01058 if( ( ret = mgf_mask( output + 1, hlen, output + hlen + 1, olen - hlen - 1, 01059 &md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) 01060 goto exit; 01061 01062 exit: 01063 mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); 01064 01065 if( ret != 0 ) 01066 return( ret ); 01067 01068 return( ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ) 01069 ? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, output, output ) 01070 : mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, output, output ) ); 01071 } 01072 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ 01073 01074 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) 01075 /* 01076 * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCRYPT function 01077 */ 01078 int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, 01079 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), 01080 void *p_rng, 01081 int mode, size_t ilen, 01082 const unsigned char *input, 01083 unsigned char *output ) 01084 { 01085 size_t nb_pad, olen; 01086 int ret; 01087 unsigned char *p = output; 01088 01089 if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 ) 01090 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 01091 01092 // We don't check p_rng because it won't be dereferenced here 01093 if( f_rng == NULL || input == NULL || output == NULL ) 01094 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 01095 01096 olen = ctx->len ; 01097 01098 /* first comparison checks for overflow */ 01099 if( ilen + 11 < ilen || olen < ilen + 11 ) 01100 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 01101 01102 nb_pad = olen - 3 - ilen; 01103 01104 *p++ = 0; 01105 if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ) 01106 { 01107 *p++ = MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT; 01108 01109 while( nb_pad-- > 0 ) 01110 { 01111 int rng_dl = 100; 01112 01113 do { 01114 ret = f_rng( p_rng, p, 1 ); 01115 } while( *p == 0 && --rng_dl && ret == 0 ); 01116 01117 /* Check if RNG failed to generate data */ 01118 if( rng_dl == 0 || ret != 0 ) 01119 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED + ret ); 01120 01121 p++; 01122 } 01123 } 01124 else 01125 { 01126 *p++ = MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN; 01127 01128 while( nb_pad-- > 0 ) 01129 *p++ = 0xFF; 01130 } 01131 01132 *p++ = 0; 01133 memcpy( p, input, ilen ); 01134 01135 return( ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ) 01136 ? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, output, output ) 01137 : mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, output, output ) ); 01138 } 01139 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ 01140 01141 /* 01142 * Add the message padding, then do an RSA operation 01143 */ 01144 int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, 01145 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), 01146 void *p_rng, 01147 int mode, size_t ilen, 01148 const unsigned char *input, 01149 unsigned char *output ) 01150 { 01151 switch( ctx->padding ) 01152 { 01153 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) 01154 case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: 01155 return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_encrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, ilen, 01156 input, output ); 01157 #endif 01158 01159 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) 01160 case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: 01161 return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_encrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, NULL, 0, 01162 ilen, input, output ); 01163 #endif 01164 01165 default: 01166 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ); 01167 } 01168 } 01169 01170 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) 01171 /* 01172 * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-OAEP-DECRYPT function 01173 */ 01174 int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, 01175 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), 01176 void *p_rng, 01177 int mode, 01178 const unsigned char *label, size_t label_len, 01179 size_t *olen, 01180 const unsigned char *input, 01181 unsigned char *output, 01182 size_t output_max_len ) 01183 { 01184 int ret; 01185 size_t ilen, i, pad_len; 01186 unsigned char *p, bad, pad_done; 01187 unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; 01188 unsigned char lhash[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; 01189 unsigned int hlen; 01190 const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; 01191 mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; 01192 01193 /* 01194 * Parameters sanity checks 01195 */ 01196 if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 ) 01197 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 01198 01199 ilen = ctx->len ; 01200 01201 if( ilen < 16 || ilen > sizeof( buf ) ) 01202 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 01203 01204 md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id ); 01205 if( md_info == NULL ) 01206 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 01207 01208 hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); 01209 01210 // checking for integer underflow 01211 if( 2 * hlen + 2 > ilen ) 01212 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 01213 01214 /* 01215 * RSA operation 01216 */ 01217 ret = ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ) 01218 ? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, input, buf ) 01219 : mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf ); 01220 01221 if( ret != 0 ) 01222 goto cleanup; 01223 01224 /* 01225 * Unmask data and generate lHash 01226 */ 01227 mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx ); 01228 if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 ) 01229 { 01230 mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); 01231 goto cleanup; 01232 } 01233 01234 /* seed: Apply seedMask to maskedSeed */ 01235 if( ( ret = mgf_mask( buf + 1, hlen, buf + hlen + 1, ilen - hlen - 1, 01236 &md_ctx ) ) != 0 || 01237 /* DB: Apply dbMask to maskedDB */ 01238 ( ret = mgf_mask( buf + hlen + 1, ilen - hlen - 1, buf + 1, hlen, 01239 &md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) 01240 { 01241 mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); 01242 goto cleanup; 01243 } 01244 01245 mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); 01246 01247 /* Generate lHash */ 01248 if( ( ret = mbedtls_md( md_info, label, label_len, lhash ) ) != 0 ) 01249 goto cleanup; 01250 01251 /* 01252 * Check contents, in "constant-time" 01253 */ 01254 p = buf; 01255 bad = 0; 01256 01257 bad |= *p++; /* First byte must be 0 */ 01258 01259 p += hlen; /* Skip seed */ 01260 01261 /* Check lHash */ 01262 for( i = 0; i < hlen; i++ ) 01263 bad |= lhash[i] ^ *p++; 01264 01265 /* Get zero-padding len, but always read till end of buffer 01266 * (minus one, for the 01 byte) */ 01267 pad_len = 0; 01268 pad_done = 0; 01269 for( i = 0; i < ilen - 2 * hlen - 2; i++ ) 01270 { 01271 pad_done |= p[i]; 01272 pad_len += ((pad_done | (unsigned char)-pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1; 01273 } 01274 01275 p += pad_len; 01276 bad |= *p++ ^ 0x01; 01277 01278 /* 01279 * The only information "leaked" is whether the padding was correct or not 01280 * (eg, no data is copied if it was not correct). This meets the 01281 * recommendations in PKCS#1 v2.2: an opponent cannot distinguish between 01282 * the different error conditions. 01283 */ 01284 if( bad != 0 ) 01285 { 01286 ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; 01287 goto cleanup; 01288 } 01289 01290 if( ilen - ( p - buf ) > output_max_len ) 01291 { 01292 ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE; 01293 goto cleanup; 01294 } 01295 01296 *olen = ilen - (p - buf); 01297 memcpy( output, p, *olen ); 01298 ret = 0; 01299 01300 cleanup: 01301 mbedtls_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); 01302 mbedtls_zeroize( lhash, sizeof( lhash ) ); 01303 01304 return( ret ); 01305 } 01306 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ 01307 01308 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) 01309 /* 01310 * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5-DECRYPT function 01311 */ 01312 int mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, 01313 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), 01314 void *p_rng, 01315 int mode, size_t *olen, 01316 const unsigned char *input, 01317 unsigned char *output, 01318 size_t output_max_len) 01319 { 01320 int ret; 01321 size_t ilen, pad_count = 0, i; 01322 unsigned char *p, bad, pad_done = 0; 01323 unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; 01324 01325 if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 ) 01326 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 01327 01328 ilen = ctx->len ; 01329 01330 if( ilen < 16 || ilen > sizeof( buf ) ) 01331 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 01332 01333 ret = ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ) 01334 ? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, input, buf ) 01335 : mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, input, buf ); 01336 01337 if( ret != 0 ) 01338 goto cleanup; 01339 01340 p = buf; 01341 bad = 0; 01342 01343 /* 01344 * Check and get padding len in "constant-time" 01345 */ 01346 bad |= *p++; /* First byte must be 0 */ 01347 01348 /* This test does not depend on secret data */ 01349 if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE ) 01350 { 01351 bad |= *p++ ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_CRYPT; 01352 01353 /* Get padding len, but always read till end of buffer 01354 * (minus one, for the 00 byte) */ 01355 for( i = 0; i < ilen - 3; i++ ) 01356 { 01357 pad_done |= ((p[i] | (unsigned char)-p[i]) >> 7) ^ 1; 01358 pad_count += ((pad_done | (unsigned char)-pad_done) >> 7) ^ 1; 01359 } 01360 01361 p += pad_count; 01362 bad |= *p++; /* Must be zero */ 01363 } 01364 else 01365 { 01366 bad |= *p++ ^ MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN; 01367 01368 /* Get padding len, but always read till end of buffer 01369 * (minus one, for the 00 byte) */ 01370 for( i = 0; i < ilen - 3; i++ ) 01371 { 01372 pad_done |= ( p[i] != 0xFF ); 01373 pad_count += ( pad_done == 0 ); 01374 } 01375 01376 p += pad_count; 01377 bad |= *p++; /* Must be zero */ 01378 } 01379 01380 bad |= ( pad_count < 8 ); 01381 01382 if( bad ) 01383 { 01384 ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; 01385 goto cleanup; 01386 } 01387 01388 if( ilen - ( p - buf ) > output_max_len ) 01389 { 01390 ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE; 01391 goto cleanup; 01392 } 01393 01394 *olen = ilen - (p - buf); 01395 memcpy( output, p, *olen ); 01396 ret = 0; 01397 01398 cleanup: 01399 mbedtls_zeroize( buf, sizeof( buf ) ); 01400 01401 return( ret ); 01402 } 01403 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ 01404 01405 /* 01406 * Do an RSA operation, then remove the message padding 01407 */ 01408 int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, 01409 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), 01410 void *p_rng, 01411 int mode, size_t *olen, 01412 const unsigned char *input, 01413 unsigned char *output, 01414 size_t output_max_len) 01415 { 01416 switch( ctx->padding ) 01417 { 01418 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) 01419 case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: 01420 return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_pkcs1_v15_decrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, olen, 01421 input, output, output_max_len ); 01422 #endif 01423 01424 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) 01425 case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: 01426 return mbedtls_rsa_rsaes_oaep_decrypt( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, NULL, 0, 01427 olen, input, output, 01428 output_max_len ); 01429 #endif 01430 01431 default: 01432 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ); 01433 } 01434 } 01435 01436 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) 01437 /* 01438 * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-SIGN function 01439 */ 01440 int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, 01441 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), 01442 void *p_rng, 01443 int mode, 01444 mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, 01445 unsigned int hashlen, 01446 const unsigned char *hash, 01447 unsigned char *sig ) 01448 { 01449 size_t olen; 01450 unsigned char *p = sig; 01451 unsigned char salt[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; 01452 unsigned int slen, hlen, offset = 0; 01453 int ret; 01454 size_t msb; 01455 const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; 01456 mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; 01457 01458 if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 ) 01459 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 01460 01461 if( f_rng == NULL ) 01462 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 01463 01464 olen = ctx->len ; 01465 01466 if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) 01467 { 01468 /* Gather length of hash to sign */ 01469 md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ); 01470 if( md_info == NULL ) 01471 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 01472 01473 hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); 01474 } 01475 01476 md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id ); 01477 if( md_info == NULL ) 01478 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 01479 01480 hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); 01481 slen = hlen; 01482 01483 if( olen < hlen + slen + 2 ) 01484 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 01485 01486 memset( sig, 0, olen ); 01487 01488 /* Generate salt of length slen */ 01489 if( ( ret = f_rng( p_rng, salt, slen ) ) != 0 ) 01490 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_RNG_FAILED + ret ); 01491 01492 /* Note: EMSA-PSS encoding is over the length of N - 1 bits */ 01493 msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->N ) - 1; 01494 p += olen - hlen * 2 - 2; 01495 *p++ = 0x01; 01496 memcpy( p, salt, slen ); 01497 p += slen; 01498 01499 mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx ); 01500 if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 ) 01501 goto exit; 01502 01503 /* Generate H = Hash( M' ) */ 01504 if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_starts( &md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) 01505 goto exit; 01506 if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, p, 8 ) ) != 0 ) 01507 goto exit; 01508 if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, hash, hashlen ) ) != 0 ) 01509 goto exit; 01510 if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, salt, slen ) ) != 0 ) 01511 goto exit; 01512 if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_finish( &md_ctx, p ) ) != 0 ) 01513 goto exit; 01514 01515 /* Compensate for boundary condition when applying mask */ 01516 if( msb % 8 == 0 ) 01517 offset = 1; 01518 01519 /* maskedDB: Apply dbMask to DB */ 01520 if( ( ret = mgf_mask( sig + offset, olen - hlen - 1 - offset, p, hlen, 01521 &md_ctx ) ) != 0 ) 01522 goto exit; 01523 01524 msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->N ) - 1; 01525 sig[0] &= 0xFF >> ( olen * 8 - msb ); 01526 01527 p += hlen; 01528 *p++ = 0xBC; 01529 01530 mbedtls_zeroize( salt, sizeof( salt ) ); 01531 01532 exit: 01533 mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); 01534 01535 if( ret != 0 ) 01536 return( ret ); 01537 01538 return( ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ) 01539 ? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig, sig ) 01540 : mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig ) ); 01541 } 01542 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ 01543 01544 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) 01545 /* 01546 * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-SIGN function 01547 */ 01548 01549 /* Construct a PKCS v1.5 encoding of a hashed message 01550 * 01551 * This is used both for signature generation and verification. 01552 * 01553 * Parameters: 01554 * - md_alg: Identifies the hash algorithm used to generate the given hash; 01555 * MBEDTLS_MD_NONE if raw data is signed. 01556 * - hashlen: Length of hash in case hashlen is MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. 01557 * - hash: Buffer containing the hashed message or the raw data. 01558 * - dst_len: Length of the encoded message. 01559 * - dst: Buffer to hold the encoded message. 01560 * 01561 * Assumptions: 01562 * - hash has size hashlen if md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. 01563 * - hash has size corresponding to md_alg if md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE. 01564 * - dst points to a buffer of size at least dst_len. 01565 * 01566 */ 01567 static int rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode( mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, 01568 unsigned int hashlen, 01569 const unsigned char *hash, 01570 size_t dst_len, 01571 unsigned char *dst ) 01572 { 01573 size_t oid_size = 0; 01574 size_t nb_pad = dst_len; 01575 unsigned char *p = dst; 01576 const char *oid = NULL; 01577 01578 /* Are we signing hashed or raw data? */ 01579 if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) 01580 { 01581 const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ); 01582 if( md_info == NULL ) 01583 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 01584 01585 if( mbedtls_oid_get_oid_by_md( md_alg, &oid, &oid_size ) != 0 ) 01586 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 01587 01588 hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); 01589 01590 /* Double-check that 8 + hashlen + oid_size can be used as a 01591 * 1-byte ASN.1 length encoding and that there's no overflow. */ 01592 if( 8 + hashlen + oid_size >= 0x80 || 01593 10 + hashlen < hashlen || 01594 10 + hashlen + oid_size < 10 + hashlen ) 01595 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 01596 01597 /* 01598 * Static bounds check: 01599 * - Need 10 bytes for five tag-length pairs. 01600 * (Insist on 1-byte length encodings to protect against variants of 01601 * Bleichenbacher's forgery attack against lax PKCS#1v1.5 verification) 01602 * - Need hashlen bytes for hash 01603 * - Need oid_size bytes for hash alg OID. 01604 */ 01605 if( nb_pad < 10 + hashlen + oid_size ) 01606 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 01607 nb_pad -= 10 + hashlen + oid_size; 01608 } 01609 else 01610 { 01611 if( nb_pad < hashlen ) 01612 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 01613 01614 nb_pad -= hashlen; 01615 } 01616 01617 /* Need space for signature header and padding delimiter (3 bytes), 01618 * and 8 bytes for the minimal padding */ 01619 if( nb_pad < 3 + 8 ) 01620 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 01621 nb_pad -= 3; 01622 01623 /* Now nb_pad is the amount of memory to be filled 01624 * with padding, and at least 8 bytes long. */ 01625 01626 /* Write signature header and padding */ 01627 *p++ = 0; 01628 *p++ = MBEDTLS_RSA_SIGN; 01629 memset( p, 0xFF, nb_pad ); 01630 p += nb_pad; 01631 *p++ = 0; 01632 01633 /* Are we signing raw data? */ 01634 if( md_alg == MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) 01635 { 01636 memcpy( p, hash, hashlen ); 01637 return( 0 ); 01638 } 01639 01640 /* Signing hashed data, add corresponding ASN.1 structure 01641 * 01642 * DigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE { 01643 * digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmIdentifier, 01644 * digest Digest } 01645 * DigestAlgorithmIdentifier ::= AlgorithmIdentifier 01646 * Digest ::= OCTET STRING 01647 * 01648 * Schematic: 01649 * TAG-SEQ + LEN [ TAG-SEQ + LEN [ TAG-OID + LEN [ OID ] 01650 * TAG-NULL + LEN [ NULL ] ] 01651 * TAG-OCTET + LEN [ HASH ] ] 01652 */ 01653 *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED; 01654 *p++ = (unsigned char)( 0x08 + oid_size + hashlen ); 01655 *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_SEQUENCE | MBEDTLS_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED; 01656 *p++ = (unsigned char)( 0x04 + oid_size ); 01657 *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OID; 01658 *p++ = (unsigned char) oid_size; 01659 memcpy( p, oid, oid_size ); 01660 p += oid_size; 01661 *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_NULL; 01662 *p++ = 0x00; 01663 *p++ = MBEDTLS_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; 01664 *p++ = (unsigned char) hashlen; 01665 memcpy( p, hash, hashlen ); 01666 p += hashlen; 01667 01668 /* Just a sanity-check, should be automatic 01669 * after the initial bounds check. */ 01670 if( p != dst + dst_len ) 01671 { 01672 mbedtls_zeroize( dst, dst_len ); 01673 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 01674 } 01675 01676 return( 0 ); 01677 } 01678 01679 /* 01680 * Do an RSA operation to sign the message digest 01681 */ 01682 int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, 01683 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), 01684 void *p_rng, 01685 int mode, 01686 mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, 01687 unsigned int hashlen, 01688 const unsigned char *hash, 01689 unsigned char *sig ) 01690 { 01691 int ret; 01692 unsigned char *sig_try = NULL, *verif = NULL; 01693 01694 if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 ) 01695 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 01696 01697 /* 01698 * Prepare PKCS1-v1.5 encoding (padding and hash identifier) 01699 */ 01700 01701 if( ( ret = rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode( md_alg, hashlen, hash, 01702 ctx->len , sig ) ) != 0 ) 01703 return( ret ); 01704 01705 /* 01706 * Call respective RSA primitive 01707 */ 01708 01709 if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ) 01710 { 01711 /* Skip verification on a public key operation */ 01712 return( mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig, sig ) ); 01713 } 01714 01715 /* Private key operation 01716 * 01717 * In order to prevent Lenstra's attack, make the signature in a 01718 * temporary buffer and check it before returning it. 01719 */ 01720 01721 sig_try = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ctx->len ); 01722 if( sig_try == NULL ) 01723 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED ); 01724 01725 verif = mbedtls_calloc( 1, ctx->len ); 01726 if( verif == NULL ) 01727 { 01728 mbedtls_free( sig_try ); 01729 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED ); 01730 } 01731 01732 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, sig_try ) ); 01733 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig_try, verif ) ); 01734 01735 if( mbedtls_safer_memcmp( verif, sig, ctx->len ) != 0 ) 01736 { 01737 ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_PRIVATE_FAILED; 01738 goto cleanup; 01739 } 01740 01741 memcpy( sig, sig_try, ctx->len ); 01742 01743 cleanup: 01744 mbedtls_free( sig_try ); 01745 mbedtls_free( verif ); 01746 01747 return( ret ); 01748 } 01749 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ 01750 01751 /* 01752 * Do an RSA operation to sign the message digest 01753 */ 01754 int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, 01755 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), 01756 void *p_rng, 01757 int mode, 01758 mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, 01759 unsigned int hashlen, 01760 const unsigned char *hash, 01761 unsigned char *sig ) 01762 { 01763 switch( ctx->padding ) 01764 { 01765 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) 01766 case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: 01767 return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg, 01768 hashlen, hash, sig ); 01769 #endif 01770 01771 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) 01772 case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: 01773 return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_sign( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg, 01774 hashlen, hash, sig ); 01775 #endif 01776 01777 default: 01778 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ); 01779 } 01780 } 01781 01782 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) 01783 /* 01784 * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY function 01785 */ 01786 int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, 01787 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), 01788 void *p_rng, 01789 int mode, 01790 mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, 01791 unsigned int hashlen, 01792 const unsigned char *hash, 01793 mbedtls_md_type_t mgf1_hash_id, 01794 int expected_salt_len, 01795 const unsigned char *sig ) 01796 { 01797 int ret; 01798 size_t siglen; 01799 unsigned char *p; 01800 unsigned char *hash_start; 01801 unsigned char result[MBEDTLS_MD_MAX_SIZE]; 01802 unsigned char zeros[8]; 01803 unsigned int hlen; 01804 size_t observed_salt_len, msb; 01805 const mbedtls_md_info_t *md_info; 01806 mbedtls_md_context_t md_ctx; 01807 unsigned char buf[MBEDTLS_MPI_MAX_SIZE]; 01808 01809 if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21 ) 01810 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 01811 01812 siglen = ctx->len ; 01813 01814 if( siglen < 16 || siglen > sizeof( buf ) ) 01815 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 01816 01817 ret = ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ) 01818 ? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig, buf ) 01819 : mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, buf ); 01820 01821 if( ret != 0 ) 01822 return( ret ); 01823 01824 p = buf; 01825 01826 if( buf[siglen - 1] != 0xBC ) 01827 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ); 01828 01829 if( md_alg != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) 01830 { 01831 /* Gather length of hash to sign */ 01832 md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( md_alg ); 01833 if( md_info == NULL ) 01834 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 01835 01836 hashlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); 01837 } 01838 01839 md_info = mbedtls_md_info_from_type( mgf1_hash_id ); 01840 if( md_info == NULL ) 01841 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 01842 01843 hlen = mbedtls_md_get_size( md_info ); 01844 01845 memset( zeros, 0, 8 ); 01846 01847 /* 01848 * Note: EMSA-PSS verification is over the length of N - 1 bits 01849 */ 01850 msb = mbedtls_mpi_bitlen( &ctx->N ) - 1; 01851 01852 if( buf[0] >> ( 8 - siglen * 8 + msb ) ) 01853 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 01854 01855 /* Compensate for boundary condition when applying mask */ 01856 if( msb % 8 == 0 ) 01857 { 01858 p++; 01859 siglen -= 1; 01860 } 01861 01862 if( siglen < hlen + 2 ) 01863 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 01864 hash_start = p + siglen - hlen - 1; 01865 01866 mbedtls_md_init( &md_ctx ); 01867 if( ( ret = mbedtls_md_setup( &md_ctx, md_info, 0 ) ) != 0 ) 01868 goto exit; 01869 01870 ret = mgf_mask( p, siglen - hlen - 1, hash_start, hlen, &md_ctx ); 01871 if( ret != 0 ) 01872 goto exit; 01873 01874 buf[0] &= 0xFF >> ( siglen * 8 - msb ); 01875 01876 while( p < hash_start - 1 && *p == 0 ) 01877 p++; 01878 01879 if( *p++ != 0x01 ) 01880 { 01881 ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; 01882 goto exit; 01883 } 01884 01885 observed_salt_len = hash_start - p; 01886 01887 if( expected_salt_len != MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY && 01888 observed_salt_len != (size_t) expected_salt_len ) 01889 { 01890 ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING; 01891 goto exit; 01892 } 01893 01894 /* 01895 * Generate H = Hash( M' ) 01896 */ 01897 ret = mbedtls_md_starts( &md_ctx ); 01898 if ( ret != 0 ) 01899 goto exit; 01900 ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, zeros, 8 ); 01901 if ( ret != 0 ) 01902 goto exit; 01903 ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, hash, hashlen ); 01904 if ( ret != 0 ) 01905 goto exit; 01906 ret = mbedtls_md_update( &md_ctx, p, observed_salt_len ); 01907 if ( ret != 0 ) 01908 goto exit; 01909 ret = mbedtls_md_finish( &md_ctx, result ); 01910 if ( ret != 0 ) 01911 goto exit; 01912 01913 if( memcmp( hash_start, result, hlen ) != 0 ) 01914 { 01915 ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED; 01916 goto exit; 01917 } 01918 01919 exit: 01920 mbedtls_md_free( &md_ctx ); 01921 01922 return( ret ); 01923 } 01924 01925 /* 01926 * Simplified PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY function 01927 */ 01928 int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, 01929 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), 01930 void *p_rng, 01931 int mode, 01932 mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, 01933 unsigned int hashlen, 01934 const unsigned char *hash, 01935 const unsigned char *sig ) 01936 { 01937 mbedtls_md_type_t mgf1_hash_id = ( ctx->hash_id != MBEDTLS_MD_NONE ) 01938 ? (mbedtls_md_type_t) ctx->hash_id 01939 : md_alg; 01940 01941 return( mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify_ext( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, 01942 md_alg, hashlen, hash, 01943 mgf1_hash_id, MBEDTLS_RSA_SALT_LEN_ANY, 01944 sig ) ); 01945 01946 } 01947 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21 */ 01948 01949 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) 01950 /* 01951 * Implementation of the PKCS#1 v2.1 RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5-VERIFY function 01952 */ 01953 int mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, 01954 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), 01955 void *p_rng, 01956 int mode, 01957 mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, 01958 unsigned int hashlen, 01959 const unsigned char *hash, 01960 const unsigned char *sig ) 01961 { 01962 int ret = 0; 01963 const size_t sig_len = ctx->len ; 01964 unsigned char *encoded = NULL, *encoded_expected = NULL; 01965 01966 if( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE && ctx->padding != MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15 ) 01967 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_BAD_INPUT_DATA ); 01968 01969 /* 01970 * Prepare expected PKCS1 v1.5 encoding of hash. 01971 */ 01972 01973 if( ( encoded = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sig_len ) ) == NULL || 01974 ( encoded_expected = mbedtls_calloc( 1, sig_len ) ) == NULL ) 01975 { 01976 ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_MPI_ALLOC_FAILED; 01977 goto cleanup; 01978 } 01979 01980 if( ( ret = rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_encode( md_alg, hashlen, hash, sig_len, 01981 encoded_expected ) ) != 0 ) 01982 goto cleanup; 01983 01984 /* 01985 * Apply RSA primitive to get what should be PKCS1 encoded hash. 01986 */ 01987 01988 ret = ( mode == MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC ) 01989 ? mbedtls_rsa_public( ctx, sig, encoded ) 01990 : mbedtls_rsa_private( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, sig, encoded ); 01991 if( ret != 0 ) 01992 goto cleanup; 01993 01994 /* 01995 * Compare 01996 */ 01997 01998 if( ( ret = mbedtls_safer_memcmp( encoded, encoded_expected, 01999 sig_len ) ) != 0 ) 02000 { 02001 ret = MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_VERIFY_FAILED; 02002 goto cleanup; 02003 } 02004 02005 cleanup: 02006 02007 if( encoded != NULL ) 02008 { 02009 mbedtls_zeroize( encoded, sig_len ); 02010 mbedtls_free( encoded ); 02011 } 02012 02013 if( encoded_expected != NULL ) 02014 { 02015 mbedtls_zeroize( encoded_expected, sig_len ); 02016 mbedtls_free( encoded_expected ); 02017 } 02018 02019 return( ret ); 02020 } 02021 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ 02022 02023 /* 02024 * Do an RSA operation and check the message digest 02025 */ 02026 int mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx, 02027 int (*f_rng)(void *, unsigned char *, size_t), 02028 void *p_rng, 02029 int mode, 02030 mbedtls_md_type_t md_alg, 02031 unsigned int hashlen, 02032 const unsigned char *hash, 02033 const unsigned char *sig ) 02034 { 02035 switch( ctx->padding ) 02036 { 02037 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) 02038 case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15: 02039 return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pkcs1_v15_verify( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg, 02040 hashlen, hash, sig ); 02041 #endif 02042 02043 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V21) 02044 case MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V21: 02045 return mbedtls_rsa_rsassa_pss_verify( ctx, f_rng, p_rng, mode, md_alg, 02046 hashlen, hash, sig ); 02047 #endif 02048 02049 default: 02050 return( MBEDTLS_ERR_RSA_INVALID_PADDING ); 02051 } 02052 } 02053 02054 /* 02055 * Copy the components of an RSA key 02056 */ 02057 int mbedtls_rsa_copy( mbedtls_rsa_context *dst, const mbedtls_rsa_context *src ) 02058 { 02059 int ret; 02060 02061 dst->ver = src->ver ; 02062 dst->len = src->len ; 02063 02064 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->N , &src->N ) ); 02065 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->E , &src->E ) ); 02066 02067 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->D , &src->D ) ); 02068 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->P , &src->P ) ); 02069 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->Q , &src->Q ) ); 02070 02071 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) 02072 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->DP , &src->DP ) ); 02073 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->DQ , &src->DQ ) ); 02074 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->QP , &src->QP ) ); 02075 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->RP , &src->RP ) ); 02076 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->RQ , &src->RQ ) ); 02077 #endif 02078 02079 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->RN , &src->RN ) ); 02080 02081 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->Vi , &src->Vi ) ); 02082 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_copy( &dst->Vf , &src->Vf ) ); 02083 02084 dst->padding = src->padding ; 02085 dst->hash_id = src->hash_id ; 02086 02087 cleanup: 02088 if( ret != 0 ) 02089 mbedtls_rsa_free( dst ); 02090 02091 return( ret ); 02092 } 02093 02094 /* 02095 * Free the components of an RSA key 02096 */ 02097 void mbedtls_rsa_free( mbedtls_rsa_context *ctx ) 02098 { 02099 mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->Vi ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->Vf ); 02100 mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->RN ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->D ); 02101 mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->Q ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->P ); 02102 mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->E ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->N ); 02103 02104 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT) 02105 mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->RQ ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->RP ); 02106 mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->QP ); mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->DQ ); 02107 mbedtls_mpi_free( &ctx->DP ); 02108 #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_NO_CRT */ 02109 02110 #if defined(MBEDTLS_THREADING_C) 02111 mbedtls_mutex_free( &ctx->mutex ); 02112 #endif 02113 } 02114 02115 #endif /* !MBEDTLS_RSA_ALT */ 02116 02117 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST) 02118 02119 #include "mbedtls/sha1.h" 02120 02121 /* 02122 * Example RSA-1024 keypair, for test purposes 02123 */ 02124 #define KEY_LEN 128 02125 02126 #define RSA_N "9292758453063D803DD603D5E777D788" \ 02127 "8ED1D5BF35786190FA2F23EBC0848AEA" \ 02128 "DDA92CA6C3D80B32C4D109BE0F36D6AE" \ 02129 "7130B9CED7ACDF54CFC7555AC14EEBAB" \ 02130 "93A89813FBF3C4F8066D2D800F7C38A8" \ 02131 "1AE31942917403FF4946B0A83D3D3E05" \ 02132 "EE57C6F5F5606FB5D4BC6CD34EE0801A" \ 02133 "5E94BB77B07507233A0BC7BAC8F90F79" 02134 02135 #define RSA_E "10001" 02136 02137 #define RSA_D "24BF6185468786FDD303083D25E64EFC" \ 02138 "66CA472BC44D253102F8B4A9D3BFA750" \ 02139 "91386C0077937FE33FA3252D28855837" \ 02140 "AE1B484A8A9A45F7EE8C0C634F99E8CD" \ 02141 "DF79C5CE07EE72C7F123142198164234" \ 02142 "CABB724CF78B8173B9F880FC86322407" \ 02143 "AF1FEDFDDE2BEB674CA15F3E81A1521E" \ 02144 "071513A1E85B5DFA031F21ECAE91A34D" 02145 02146 #define RSA_P "C36D0EB7FCD285223CFB5AABA5BDA3D8" \ 02147 "2C01CAD19EA484A87EA4377637E75500" \ 02148 "FCB2005C5C7DD6EC4AC023CDA285D796" \ 02149 "C3D9E75E1EFC42488BB4F1D13AC30A57" 02150 02151 #define RSA_Q "C000DF51A7C77AE8D7C7370C1FF55B69" \ 02152 "E211C2B9E5DB1ED0BF61D0D9899620F4" \ 02153 "910E4168387E3C30AA1E00C339A79508" \ 02154 "8452DD96A9A5EA5D9DCA68DA636032AF" 02155 02156 #define PT_LEN 24 02157 #define RSA_PT "\xAA\xBB\xCC\x03\x02\x01\x00\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF\xFF" \ 02158 "\x11\x22\x33\x0A\x0B\x0C\xCC\xDD\xDD\xDD\xDD\xDD" 02159 02160 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) 02161 static int myrand( void *rng_state, unsigned char *output, size_t len ) 02162 { 02163 #if !defined(__OpenBSD__) 02164 size_t i; 02165 02166 if( rng_state != NULL ) 02167 rng_state = NULL; 02168 02169 for( i = 0; i < len; ++i ) 02170 output[i] = rand(); 02171 #else 02172 if( rng_state != NULL ) 02173 rng_state = NULL; 02174 02175 arc4random_buf( output, len ); 02176 #endif /* !OpenBSD */ 02177 02178 return( 0 ); 02179 } 02180 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ 02181 02182 /* 02183 * Checkup routine 02184 */ 02185 int mbedtls_rsa_self_test( int verbose ) 02186 { 02187 int ret = 0; 02188 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15) 02189 size_t len; 02190 mbedtls_rsa_context rsa; 02191 unsigned char rsa_plaintext[PT_LEN]; 02192 unsigned char rsa_decrypted[PT_LEN]; 02193 unsigned char rsa_ciphertext[KEY_LEN]; 02194 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) 02195 unsigned char sha1sum[20]; 02196 #endif 02197 02198 mbedtls_mpi K; 02199 02200 mbedtls_mpi_init( &K ); 02201 mbedtls_rsa_init( &rsa, MBEDTLS_RSA_PKCS_V15, 0 ); 02202 02203 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &K, 16, RSA_N ) ); 02204 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_import( &rsa, &K, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL ) ); 02205 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &K, 16, RSA_P ) ); 02206 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_import( &rsa, NULL, &K, NULL, NULL, NULL ) ); 02207 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &K, 16, RSA_Q ) ); 02208 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_import( &rsa, NULL, NULL, &K, NULL, NULL ) ); 02209 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &K, 16, RSA_D ) ); 02210 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_import( &rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, &K, NULL ) ); 02211 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_mpi_read_string( &K, 16, RSA_E ) ); 02212 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_import( &rsa, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &K ) ); 02213 02214 MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK( mbedtls_rsa_complete( &rsa ) ); 02215 02216 if( verbose != 0 ) 02217 mbedtls_printf( " RSA key validation: " ); 02218 02219 if( mbedtls_rsa_check_pubkey( &rsa ) != 0 || 02220 mbedtls_rsa_check_privkey( &rsa ) != 0 ) 02221 { 02222 if( verbose != 0 ) 02223 mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); 02224 02225 return( 1 ); 02226 } 02227 02228 if( verbose != 0 ) 02229 mbedtls_printf( "passed\n PKCS#1 encryption : " ); 02230 02231 memcpy( rsa_plaintext, RSA_PT, PT_LEN ); 02232 02233 if( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_encrypt( &rsa, myrand, NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, 02234 PT_LEN, rsa_plaintext, 02235 rsa_ciphertext ) != 0 ) 02236 { 02237 if( verbose != 0 ) 02238 mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); 02239 02240 return( 1 ); 02241 } 02242 02243 if( verbose != 0 ) 02244 mbedtls_printf( "passed\n PKCS#1 decryption : " ); 02245 02246 if( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_decrypt( &rsa, myrand, NULL, MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, 02247 &len, rsa_ciphertext, rsa_decrypted, 02248 sizeof(rsa_decrypted) ) != 0 ) 02249 { 02250 if( verbose != 0 ) 02251 mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); 02252 02253 return( 1 ); 02254 } 02255 02256 if( memcmp( rsa_decrypted, rsa_plaintext, len ) != 0 ) 02257 { 02258 if( verbose != 0 ) 02259 mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); 02260 02261 return( 1 ); 02262 } 02263 02264 if( verbose != 0 ) 02265 mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); 02266 02267 #if defined(MBEDTLS_SHA1_C) 02268 if( verbose != 0 ) 02269 mbedtls_printf( " PKCS#1 data sign : " ); 02270 02271 if( mbedtls_sha1_ret( rsa_plaintext, PT_LEN, sha1sum ) != 0 ) 02272 { 02273 if( verbose != 0 ) 02274 mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); 02275 02276 return( 1 ); 02277 } 02278 02279 if( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_sign( &rsa, myrand, NULL, 02280 MBEDTLS_RSA_PRIVATE, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 0, 02281 sha1sum, rsa_ciphertext ) != 0 ) 02282 { 02283 if( verbose != 0 ) 02284 mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); 02285 02286 return( 1 ); 02287 } 02288 02289 if( verbose != 0 ) 02290 mbedtls_printf( "passed\n PKCS#1 sig. verify: " ); 02291 02292 if( mbedtls_rsa_pkcs1_verify( &rsa, NULL, NULL, 02293 MBEDTLS_RSA_PUBLIC, MBEDTLS_MD_SHA1, 0, 02294 sha1sum, rsa_ciphertext ) != 0 ) 02295 { 02296 if( verbose != 0 ) 02297 mbedtls_printf( "failed\n" ); 02298 02299 return( 1 ); 02300 } 02301 02302 if( verbose != 0 ) 02303 mbedtls_printf( "passed\n" ); 02304 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SHA1_C */ 02305 02306 if( verbose != 0 ) 02307 mbedtls_printf( "\n" ); 02308 02309 cleanup: 02310 mbedtls_mpi_free( &K ); 02311 mbedtls_rsa_free( &rsa ); 02312 #else /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ 02313 ((void) verbose); 02314 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PKCS1_V15 */ 02315 return( ret ); 02316 } 02317 02318 #endif /* MBEDTLS_SELF_TEST */ 02319 02320 #endif /* MBEDTLS_RSA_C */
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